Gonzalez reflected the advantage they enjoyed over revolutionaries in other parts of Mexico-access to the American border. Arms and ammunition could be imported, loot to pay for these munitions could be exported, United States territory could be used as a base of operations, and the United States provided a sanctuary for the members of defeated factions. Moreover, since the majority of the population along the border were of Mexican extraction, they inevitably became caught up in the factional struggle, as, for that matter, did many of the Anglos, either out of sympathy or because the Revolution became a lucrative business. Yet despite the extent to which the Revolution spilled over into the United States, we still have but a sketchy knowledge of this phenomenon. Precisely how did Mexican juntas function, how were munitions acquired, how was recruiting conducted, and how was revolutionary activity financed? To understand this critical aspect of the Revolution we need much more work along the lines of David N. Johnson's admirable study of Maderista activities in San Antonio in 1910-1911.' "The authors wish to acknowledge the generous financial support of the Weatherhead Foundation, New York City, and the Arts and
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4 the focus will be on the secret war raging in El Paso in connection with the rebellion, that is, on the activities of Mexican factions and United States citizens and governmental agencies involved in the munitions traffic, in intelligence, and in recruiting and filibustering.
El Paso had a long history of intrigue, being at various times the headquarters for exiles, secret agents, and gunrunners. In 1865, for instance, the city was a transit point for Juarista spies and gunrunners operating against the French.
5 Three decades later, when the so-called Tomochi insurrection broke in Chihuahua, El Paso was both a source of munitions and a haven for the revolutionaries. 6 During the period 1905-1910, Magonista juntas operated in the city, and in 1908 attempted to capture Ciudad Juarez, the plot being thwarted by United States and Mexican secret service agents. 7 It was, however, during the Madero revolution in 1910-1911 that the city came into its own, with intrigue by Mexican factions remaining a constant for more than a decade.
When the Orozco rebellion erupted in March, 1912, the rebels naively assumed that the United States would permit them to import through El Paso the munitions they needed, this despite the example at hand afforded by the U.S. government having smashed the Reyista conspiracy in Texas during the fall of 1911. 8 The rebels were disconcerted when on March 14, 1912, President Taft imposed an arms embargo on munitions shipments to Mexico, subsequently modifying it to permit shipments to the Madero regime.
Notwithstanding the enormous disadvantage at which they now operated, the Orozquistas remained confident of their ability to smuggle into Mexico sufficient quantities of munitions to keep the rebellion alive. After all, smuggling was an established profession in El Paso as in other border cities. And certain respectable El Paso businessmen were adjusting to the economic dislocations resulting from the Revolution by developing new markets through the sale of munitions. Lastly, the United States government's ability to enforce the neutrality laws seemed questionable. True, the Army, a few United States marshals, the Customs Service, and the Texas Rangers 10 provided manpower for patrolling the border, but the cutting edge of neutrality enforcement was the Bureau of Investigation, and at the beginning of the rebellion there was exactly one agent in El Paso, L. E. Ross.
The principal factor that caused the Orozquista strategy in El Paso to miscarry was the close cooperation between the Bureau of Investigation and the Mexican Secret Service. There has never been a case in United States history when a foreign intelligence service has been allowed to operate within American territory as blatantly as during the period under study." In fact, the operations of these two organizations became so close that at times they were virtually indistinguishable. The pattern was for the Mexican Secret Service to conduct many of the investigations and the United States authorities to make the actual arrests. The manpower that the Mexicans provided was invaluable in supplementing the meager resources of the Bureau of Investigation. As the regional director of the Bureau informed Stanley W. Finch, the head of the agency: "The Mexican secret service agents, both at El Paso and at San Antonio, have aided us materially in the investigation of neutrality matters, and it is only just here to state that if it had not been for them, and their co-work, 10 Ironically, the Rangers, whose strength had been more than doubled continued as the head of the Mexican Secret Service in El Paso, and plunged into his new duties with enthusiasm. 16 On March 1, for instance, Molina attempted to have dynamite placed in the boilers of the Mexico Northwestern Railroad's locomotives that the rebels had captured in Juarez. A few days later, he paid a watchman $100 to steal the breech block from a five-inch howitzer that the rebels had sent across to El Paso for repair.
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Besides their own resources, the Maderista intelligence chiefs in El Paso enjoyed the services of the Thiel Detective Agency, whose employees furnished information on rebel activities not only along the border but within Chihuahua as well. Yet the Thiel Agency's activities illustrate the complexities of the situation at the time and the task confronting historians attempting to disentangle it: the Agency sent copies of its daily reports not only to the Mexican government but also to the Bureau of Investigation, and to the Mexico Northwestern Railroad as well.
18 And H. C. Kramp, the Agency's local manager, insisted on sending the Bureau's copies directly to its San Antonio regional office because he feared leaks in the Bureau's El Paso office and elsewhere along the border. the Mexican consul, Manuel Cuesta, had suborned Deputy United States Marshal A. A. Hopkins to serve as his agent. But it subsequently developed that the consul was in reality an Orozquista partisan, and whatever information passed through his hands was presumably communicated to the rebels. 21 Consul Cuesta had access to a wide variety of intelligence; among others he worked with the Thiel Agency's operatives and with H. N. Gray, an agent employed by Alberto Madero, President Madero's uncle, but Gray was reporting not only to Madero, and sometimes to Llorente, he was also an informant of the Bureau of Investigation.
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In El Paso, Sommerfeld employed a detective named L. L. Hall to smuggle ammunition in order to infiltrate the Orozquistas. Hall subsequently established an effective intelligence network, reporting directly to Sommerfeld, but he was also passing information to the Bureau. 23 And within the Bureau's El Paso office all was not well; the agent in charge, L. E. Ross, who worked intimately with Llorente and other Maderistas, had to resign under a cloud in October, 1912. It seems that while engaged in suppressing the munitions traffic, Ross and Abraham Molina were running a lucrative little business on the side by selling some of the ammunition they had seized. A man of Ross's talents, however, did not lack for employment. Immediately after being fired from the Bureau, he reappeared as a Mexican secret agent, working for Consul Llorente. 24 As for Molina, he became a Huertista agent infiltrating the nascent Constitutionalist movement. His superior, the Huetista Inspector of Consulates, Arturo M. Elias, acknowledged Molina's usefulness but had no illusions about his character, describing him as "a man of little education, very shrewd, and in my opinion having little conscience. He has no political allegiance nor does he care about politics, having no other aim than that of serving whoever pays him best, whether as a smuggler, a recruiter, or a secret agent " Much the same judgment could be made about the chief Orozquista agent operating in El Paso, Victor L. Ochoa. He had been involved in the 1893 rebellion in Chihuahua, had fled to El Paso, and had made his home there after serving a sentence in federal prison for violating the neutrality laws.
26 In 1912, Ochoa had the unenviable task of putting together an apparatus capable of combatting the combined intelligence resources of the United States and Mexican governments, and not surprisingly he failed. It was not for want of trying, for Ochoa came up with some imaginative schemes, such as offering $5,000 to have Sommerfeld assassinated, or the same sum to have the Mexican consulate blown up with Sommerfeld and Llorente in it, or organizing a jailbreak to liberate Orozquistas from the El Paso county jail. Unfortunately, his plans were uncovered by a Bureau agent and nothing came of them. 27 The one area in which he did enjoy success was the smuggling of ammunition.
The basic reason was because the Bureau of Investigation could not touch the major arms dealers in El Paso. Under the law it was not illegal to sell munitions, only to export them. Firms such as Krakauer, Zork and Moye and Shelton-Payne, accordingly, did a booming business supplying the rebels, as they had supplied the Maderistas during the initial phase of the Revolution. 28 As Adolph Krakauer later testified concerning his alleged sales to the Orozquistas: "For all I know, some of these cartridges that were bought may have been for the Madero government. I do not know. I was not supposed to know; but our business is supplying arms and ammunition, it has been for the last 25 years, and I do not propose on account of this revolution to stop it."
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The best the Bureau could do was to prepare a case charging the arms merchants with conspiracy to export munitions; but conspiracy was a most difficult offense to prove in court. In addition, juries in El Paso and throughout the border region proved reluctant to convict prominent businessmen. Nevertheless, as a test case the government indicted the firm of Krakauer in 1912 and on a change of venue removed the case to Phoenix where the trial took place the following year. The jury there true to form acquitted all the defendants. 30 In 1913, the government failed in its efforts to prosecute not only Krakauer but also the El Paso firm of Shelton-Payne and the Douglas Hardware Company (which had El Paso connections and was a subsidiary of Phelps-Dodge).
31 Throughout this period the three firms continued to flourish by supplying arms to various Mexican factions.
The El Paso dealers operated on a cash and carry basis. The Orozquistas deposited substantial sums with dealers, who then filled their orders as long as the money lasted. In the case of Krakauer, the Orozquistas utilized a code, whereby someone presenting an order for "a pound of nails" received 1,000 cartridges.
32 Freelance smugglers also patronized Krakauer extensively, for they could purchase cartridges at $30 per thousand and resell them in Juarez for $50.
33
The problem both for the Orozquistas and the freelances was that of transporting the munitions into Mexico. They employed a variety of techniques, one of the most common being for people, including children, simply to conceal small amounts on their persons and either walk across the bridge or ride the street car over. Several of the smuggling rings even made canvas vests for their runners to wear so they could carry more cartridges per trip. There was no lack of runners, especially among destitute Mexican refugees eager to earn a few cents per cartridge for carrying ammunition and knowing that if caught they would receive only a short sentence in the county jail. But obviously the load an individual could carry was limited; people were arrested with 50, 100, and in some instances 500 rounds on their persons. 34 More effective was the practice of bribing the soldiers guarding the border; although sometimes these operations failed, one failure resulting in the seizure of 10,000 rounds, it was not unheard of for soldiers to spend $100 in the red light district immediately after finishing guard duty.
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But despite the best efforts of the smugglers, and those of the arms dealers to protect their clients, the traffic through El Paso was slowed to a trickle in the late spring of 1912, at times dropping to one or two thousand cartridges a day. This was due primarily to the efforts of the Mexican Secret Service, who saturated the city with upwards of a hundred agents and informants. Besides infiltrating the smuggling rings, they clustered like vultures around the stores of Krakauer and SheltonPayne, following everyone who purchased ammunition in the hope of catching them in the act of crossing it. Moreover, Abraham Molina had a standing reward of $25 for anyone furnishing information on the arms traffic, and in this way he received valuable information from many of the runners themselves. 36 In addition, Mexican Street Service agents in El Paso were permitted to search passengers on the street cars preparing to cross to Juarez. This practice, however, had to be discontinued because of the public outcry against agents of a foreign power searching United States citizens on American soil.
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Because the munitions traffic had been drastically curtailed in El Paso, the rebels had to go farther afield for armaments. It is possible to reconstruct some of these ventures, one of the more interesting involving one Salvador Rojas V6rtiz. At Chihuahua on April 17, Pascual Orozco and his secretary Gonzalo Enrile delivered to Rojas Vertiz a check in his favor for 40,000 pesos. The check was drawn on the First National Bank of El Paso by the Banco Minero at Chihuahua. Rojas Veitiz could not The two set out for New Orleans with the money, traveling by rail and registering at the St. Charles Hotel under assumed names. Rojas Vertiz sent Miranda out to make the rounds of the hardware stores, for he hoped to acquire 500,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. The rebel agents succeeded in closing a deal on April 26 with the Stauffer Eshlemann Co. for 600 rifles and 150,000 cartridges, the rifles at $15 each and the cartridges at $29.72 per thousand. They paid the bill, $11,178, in cash. Rojas Vertiz and Miranda had to wait a week in New Orleans for the munitions to arrive; they came in by steamer from New York, and Miranda paid the crew $100 to unload them at night. In the meantime, arrangements had been completed with a local firm, the Thomas Box Factory, to store the shipment on its premises and to pack it in boxes labeled machinery. Mexican and United States agents, however, had learned of these developments, and Rojas Vertiz had the consignment stored at the Keystone Warehouse while he tried to figure out what to do. As an interim measure, he purchased an additional quantity of ammunition as well as forty trunks, for he planned to ship this consignment to El Paso by railway express. The initial shipment was to consist of seven trunks, each containing 4,000 rounds.
The operation broke down when Miranda, presumably disgruntled because his commission was only $1,500, returned to El Paso and informed L. L. Hall of the Mexican Secret Service about the whole affair. The upshot was that when the trunks arrived in El Paso on May 21, they were seized by Bureau operatives, who also arrested the Orozquista agent waiting to receive them. Rojas Vertiz managed to avoid arrest, but the munitions still in New Orleans were eventually, and ironically, sold by Miranda and one of his associates to the Mexican consul, who shipped them to El Paso and stored them at Shelton-Payne. 38 This failure was particularly galling to the Orozquistas, for they had intended to move the 
40
The rebels attempted to repeat this exploit in August. Gen. Jose" Inez Salazar bought 120,000 cartridges from the Shelton-Payne Co. for 14,000 pesos. He left 70,000 of the cartridges with the El Paso firm while he arranged to smuggle the other 50,000. They went by rail on August 2 consigned to one Frank Jenkins in Columbus. From there they were taken by wagon to a point one-half mile from the border, and on August 12, a party of Orozquistas crossed into the United States to receive the consignment. The United States authorities, however, had been monitoring the operation, and a detachment of cavalry was deployed to intercept the delivery. The Orozquistas resisted, and in the ensuing firefight one rebel and a trooper were seriously wounded; the ammunition was seized.
telegraph wires and destroyed no bridges. Furthermore, upon their return to the United States they were arrested for violating the neutrality laws. Although Charpentier and his associates had agreed to keep Llorente's involvement a secret in the event of their arrest, they now made it public, for they were angry because the consul still owed them their salaries. 44 The mercenaries and Llorente were indicted for violation of the neutrality laws, and although none of them was convicted, the affair was extremely embarassing for the consul. 45 Embarassment was as far as it went, for the American authorities had deliberately been turning a blind eye on Maderista recruiting activities. 46 By contrast, the United States had zealously enforced the neutrality laws against Orozquista recruiters during the spring of 1912. 47 Although severely harassed, the Orozquistas did manage to enlist some recruits, and even a few mercenaries. For example, in March they hired Sam Dreben and Tracy Richardson, two of the best-known mercenaries on the border, as machine gunners. But in June these adventurers abandoned the Orozquista cause and returned to El Paso, Richardson because he had been badly wounded, and Dreben because the Orozquistas were losing. 48 Dreben soon secured employment with the Maderistas, being sent to New Orleans to infiltrate the Orozquista munitions traffic in that city.
49
What may be concluded from the foregoing sketch is that the most important battle the Orozquistas lost was not second Rellano or Bachimba-it was the battle of El Paso. Besides factors such as the lack of cohesion within the ranks of the Orozquistas, it was the cooperation between the United States and Mexican governments in depriving Orozco of munitions that ultimately caused the failure of his rebellion. In so doing, the Madero regime established what was probably the most effective Mexican intelligence network on the border during the Revolution.
In a larger context, the types of activities taking place in El Paso in 1912 occurred along the length of the border for more than a decade. It is this aspect of the Revolution that has been relatively neglected. Heretofore the Revolution has been studied primarily in terms of ideology and personalities. While not deprecating the value of these approaches, it may be suggested that the border constitutes a most fruitful field of future research. The task is obviously monumental, given the thousands of individuals involved, their shifting allegiences and interlocking relationships. In fact, the topic necessitates the use of computers for name retrieval alone. But systematic investigation should eventually add a significant dimension to the history of the Revolution. As Mao Tse-Tung observed, "political power grows out of the end of the barrel of a gun." 
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